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THE IRONY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION TODAY:
WHY DO BROKERAGE FIRMS NEED JUDICIAL
PROTECTION?
Barbara Black·
In 1987 the securities industry achieved a major victory. Until then,
because of the Supreme Court's 1953 holding in Wzlko v. Swan I that
agreements to arbitrate federal securities claims contained in customer
agreements were unenforceable, customers could sue brokerage firms
and their salespersons in court, frequently before juries amenable to
sizable verdicts, including punitive damages. Success came first in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, Inc. 2 and then, two years later,
in Rodriguez:. de Qyijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 3 As a result of these
two decisions, brokerage firms could require customers to arbitrate all
disputes, even federal securities claims, in industry-sponsored arbitration
forums.
The securities industry brought its arbitration campaign at the right
time. McMahon and Rodriguez:. marked the perfect alignment of two
strong Supreme Court policies: support for arbitration4 and antipathy
toward investors' claims for securities damages in federal court. 5 Many
commentators initially viewed these decisions as a defeat for investors. 6

• James D. Hopkins Professor of Law and Co-Director, Securities Arbitration Clinic, Pace
University School of Law. B.A. Barnard,J.D. Columbia. lowe thanks to Lisa De Bock, Pace '05, for her
excellent research assistance and to my colleaguesJamesJ. Fishman and Jill I. Gross for their thoughtful
comments. Special thanks to Vicky Gannon of the Pace Law Library for her unfailing diligence and
resourcefulness over the years in tracking down sources.
I. 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953), ot'muled", Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Exp., Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
2. 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding that claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) could
be arbitrated).
3. 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (holding that claims under Securities Act of 1933 could be arbitrated).
4. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 10 (I 984} (stating that Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) "declared a national policy favoring arbitration"}.
5. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (excluding corporate
mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty claims from Rule JOb-5 coverage because of concerns of
vexatious litigation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,214 n.33 (1976) (requiring scienter to limit
class of plaintiffs who can sue under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v.I\Ianor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
739-40 (1975) (restricting standing under Rule 10b-5 because of "widespread recognition that litigation
under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general").
6. The following statement by Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in McMahon, expresses
this view: "[t]he Court thus approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolution of claims
under the Exchange Act and leaves such claims to the arbitral forum of the securities industry at a time when
the industry's abuses towards investors are more apparent than ever." 482 U.S. at 243. Investors' advocates
urged Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. See, e.g., McMahon Decision Should be 01:ertumed /0
Protect Investors, Houre Panel Told, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 31, 1988).
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Mter McMahon, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
recognized the need to reform the arbitration process to meet the
expectations of unhappy investors whose disputes would now be heard
before the industry's arbitration forums. Working with the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICAr and the Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SROs),8 the SEC instituted reforms to make the
securities arbitration forums fairer and more neutral, 9 a process that still
continues. Today investors may find arbitration preferable to litigation,
particularly since their claims frequently are stronger on the equities
than on the law. 10
Illustrating a classic example of "be careful what you wish for,"
brokerage firms no longer find arbitration entirely to their liking.
Increasingly they turn to the courts to resist arbitration, to interfere with
ongoing arbitration, or to undo the results of arbitration. The Supreme
Court has twice thwarted these attempts, adhering to its pro-arbitration
policy and reaching decisions that favor the investor. Despite these
decisions, brokerage firms continue to send their lawyers to the
courthouse. Unfortunately, as a result, both federal and state courts are
becoming increasingly involved in the securities arbitration process to
the detriment of investors.
This Article argues that increased judicial involvement in the
securities arbitration process is unwarranted. Although there are
legitimate concerns about the use of arbitration to resolve consumer and
employment disputes in lieu of litigation, the SRO arbitration process
fares well when measured by the components identified as necessary for
a fair arbitration. To the extent there are issues about the fairness of the
SRO arbitration forums, it is the investor, not the brokerage firm or
brokers, who has reason to be concerned.
Part I of this Article reviews the post-McMahon/Rodriguez Supreme
Court decisions that are pro-arbitration and pro-investor. Part II
discusses lower court decisions in which firms or individual brokers have
sought to enjoin or interfere with the arbitration of investors' disputes.
Part III looks at lower court decisions in which firms or individual
brokers have sought to vacate arbitration awards in favor of investors.

7. SICA, consisting of representatives of the SROs, the public, and the Securities Industry
Association (SIA), developed and continues to revise a Uniform Code of Arbitration. For background on
SICA, see Constantine N. Katsoris, SIC4: The First Twenry rears, 23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 483, 488-90 (1996).
8. SROs are defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994), and include the
national securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the largest
SRO.
9. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As ~ Go Along: The Role if Law in Securities
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 999-1005 (2002).
10. /d. at 1035-1040.
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Part IV examines whether the securities arbitration forums provide
customers with a fair process, and it argues that increased judicial
involvement is not necessary to ensure fairness and, in fact, works to the
detriment of investors. The Article concludes that courts, in the face of
brokerage firms' propensity to involve them in arbitration, may be
exhibiting anti-arbitration, or even anti-investor, tendencies. Courts
should heed the Supreme Court's message and resist brokers' attempts
to defeat arbitration's goal of "fair and expeditious resolution" of
disputes. II
PART ONE

Two post-McMahon/Rodriguez Supreme Court decisions involving
customer-broker disputes establish the Court's pro-arbitration and proinvestor slant. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,I2 the
brokerage firm moved to vacate the punitive damages portion of an
arbitration award, asserting that the arbitrators had no authority to
award them. The customer agreement contained a New York choice
oflaw clause, and at that time New York law did not allow arbitrators
to award punitive damages. 13 Reversing the lower federal courts'
decisions in favor of the firm, the Supreme Court held that the New
York choice oflaw clause did not clearly establish the parties' intent to
adopt the New York limitation on arbitrators' powers. Significandy, the
Court did not base its opinion solely on technical grounds of contract
interpretation, but also on its pro-arbitration policy that "due regard
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities
as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of
arbitration." 14
Mastrobuono setded the question of arbitrators' authority to award
punitive damages, an ironic outcome given that one of the principal
attractions of arbitration to the securities industry was to avoid punitive

II. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,85 (2002).
12. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
13. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976). While the New York Court
of Appeals has not yet overruled Gani9, most Appellate Division courts have abandoned the Gam!>, rule and
allow punitive damages awards. Set, e.g., Americorp Sec., Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (1st Dept.
1997).
14. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland StanfordJunior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468,476 (1989)).
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damages. Strong industry opposition to punitive damages continues, (j
as I later discuss. 16
The second decision, Howsam v. Dean Witter Rrynolds, Inc., 17 resolved a
conflict among the circuits involving the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) Dispute Resolution'sl8 six-year eligibility rule,
which bars arbitration of stale claims. 19 Mter McMahon and Rodrigue;:"
firms regularly asked courts· to enjoin customers' arbitration on the
ground that the claims were time-barred under the applicable SRO's
eligibility rule. The circuit courts were evenly divided on the characterization of the eligibility rule: did it raise a question of arbitrability that
the court must decide, or was it analogous to a statute oflimitations that
the arbitrators could decide?20
In Howsam, the Court rejected the former view and limited the scope
of arbitrability to questions
where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have
decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought
that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the
risk offorcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have
agreed to arbitrate. 21

The Court easily concluded that since the firm's customer agreement
provided for arbitration before the NASD, the parties would expect that
the arbitrators would decide procedural questions like NASD's own time
limit rule.
Both Howsam and Mastrobuono reject the brokerage firms' attempts to
limit arbitrators' powers. Moreover, Howsam contains a broader mess-

15. See SECURITIFS ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OFTHEARBITRATION PoUCy TASK FORCE
TO THE BOARD OF Go VERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFSECURITlFS DEALERS, INC. 36-38 (1996) for
a summary of the industry's arguments.
16. For post-Maslrobuono challenges to punitive damages awards, see infia notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
17. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
18. In July 2000 the NASD spun off its subsidiary, the NASD Regulation Office of Dispute
Resolution, as a new company, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., to administer NASD dispute resolution
services. See Press Release, NASD Dispute Resolution, NASD Launches New Dispute Resolution Subsidiary
Guly 17,2000), m:ailableat hup:1 Iwww.nasdadr.com/news/pr2000/ne_sectionOO_160.html(last visitedJune
25, 2003). For simplicity's sake I refer throughout to the NASD's dispute resolution office as NASD.
19. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, Rule 10304 (2003),
lWaiJableathup:1 Iwww.nasdadr.com/arb_code/arb_code.asp(lastvisitedJune 23, 2003) [hereinafter NASD
CODE 2003]. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has a similar rule, see NYSEDEPT. OF ARBITRATION,
ARTICLE XI AND NYSE CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULFS, Rule 603, at 8 (2003), lWailable at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Rules.pdfnast visited June 25, 2003) [hereinafter NYSE 2003].
20. For background, see Barbara Black, SecuriJies Arbitration Is .Nol Supposed To & So ComplicaJed:
Arbilrabiliry, the Eligibi1iry Rule, and H-7Iose Low Decides, 30 SEC. REG. LJ. 134, 140-42 (2002).
21. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79,83-84.
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age: the importance of minimizing judicial involvement in the arbitration process in order to promote the goal of "a fair and expeditious
resolution of the underlying controversy.,,22 Both of these decisions are
pro-arbitration and pro-investor. The law has come a long way since
McMahon and Rodriguez.
PART Two

As Howsam illustrates, brokerage firms frequendy go to court to enjoin
pending arbitrations on grounds that they have not agreed to arbitrate
the dispute or that arbitration is inappropriate for some other reason.
In extreme instances they have even sought judicial intervention, not to
contest arbitration, but to challenge an arbitration panel's procedural
ruling. 23 National Planning v. Achatl4 is a particularly egregious example
of judicial intervention. In Achatz, a firm initially was successful in
persuading a federal district court to dissolve an arbitration panel
because it failed to return its list of proposed arbitrators to NASD on
time. Only after the case was transferred to another district did the
second court order the arbitration to proceed with the panel as it was
originally constituted.
In too many instances courts have uncritically accepted brokers'
assertions that the disputed issue involves a question of arbitrability that
courts should decide, rather than dismissing the lawsuit and allowing the
arbitrators to resolve it. This section examines some of these recurring
situations.

Arbitrabiliry
Since "arbitration is a matter of contract,,,25 a dispute about whether
there is an agreement to arbitrate raises a question of arbitrability that
ordinarily courts should decide. In disputes arising out of ordinary
customer-broker relationships, however, there is ordinarily no question
that the matter is arbitrable, because of brokerage firms' nearly universal use of pre dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements. 26
22. /d. at 85.
23. See, e.g., Gruntal & Co. v. l\Iaha raj , 13 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying finn's
application for a TRO staying a scheduled hearing after arbitrators denied finn's adjournment request).
24. No. 02-CV-0196E(SR}, 2002 WL 31906336 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2002).
25. Howstun, 537 U.S. at 83 (citation omitted); see alm first Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 943 (1995).
26. Courts have enforced PDAAs even in situations where the individual broker engaged in massive
fraud over a substantial period of time, including stealing money from customers' accounts. See Fazio v.
Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003); Deputy v. Lehman Bros., 2003 WL 22227977 (7th Cir. 2003).

HeinOnline -- 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 419 2003-2004

420

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72

As part of the post-McMahon/Rodriguez reforms, the NASD imposes
requirements on the content and form of predispute arbitration
agreements, including a statement that the parties are waiving their right
to seek remedies in court. 27 While this language was principally
designed to provide notice to customers of the rights they are giving up,
the language contractually commits the brokerage firms as well. The
NASD makes this even clearer by its prohibition on any term in the
customer agreement that limits or contradicts its rules, limits the ability
of a party to fIle an arbitration claim, or limits the arbitrators' ability to
make an award. 28 Firms sometimes overlook the significance of this
language. 29
Even if they have not signed a predispute arbitration agreement,
customers can demand arbitration3o because SRO rules offer them the
option to arbitrate. 31 NASD Rule 10301 32 provides that a customer can
demand arbitration of any eligible claim between it and "a member
and/ or associated person33 arising in connection with the business of
such member or in connection with the activities of such associated
person." The NYSE34 rule is broader than the NASD's and provides
that anyone, whether a customer or not, can demand arbitration of any
dispute between it and "a member ... and/or associated person arising

CO~UCT

27. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS,
RULES, Rule 3110(1)(1), Books and Records
(Requirements J!lhen Using Predispute
Arbitration Agreements WUh Customers) (2003), fWai/able at
http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/NASD_Rules (last visited June 26, 2003) (hereinafter NASD CbNDUCT
2003].
28. /d. at (1)(4). See also Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54
Fed. Reg. 21144, 21154(Exchange Act Release No. 34-26805)(May 16, I 989)(" [t]his provision makes dear
that the use of arbitration for the resolution ofinvestor/broker-dealer disputes represents solely a choice of
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution"); NASD Notice to Members 89-58, Amendment re: Predispute
Arbitration Clauses in Cus/omu Agreements, 1989 WL 931 069 (National/Federal) (Aug. 1989) (calling the attention
of its members to the provision).
29. See NASD Notice to Members 95-16, Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements, 1995 WL
1712330 (NationaI/Federal) (l\-lar. 1995) (alerting its members that some members' customer agreements
contain prohibited restrictions).
30. See Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 41 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
a customer can require a broker to arbitrate, even though the arbitration clause had been stricken from the
customer's agreement).
31. See, e.g., Pa. Merch. Groupv. Schultz, No. CIV.A.96-8443, 1997 WL 71428, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
13, 1997); Hanney v. Taylor, No. 121349/00,2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 761, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26,
2001).
32. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 1030 I.
33. An "associated person" is broadly defined in Section 3(a)(IB) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)( IB),
and includes partners, officers, directors, branch managers, controlling persons, and employees (except those
performing solely clerical or ministerial tasks) of broker-dealers.
34. See NYSE 2003, supra note 19; NYSE Const., Art. XI, § I, at I; Rule 600(a) at 2.
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in connection with the business of such member ... and/ or associated
person in connection with his activities as an associated person."
Notwithstanding the inclusiveness ofthese rules, brokerage firms may
contest their application to a particular dispute when an investor seeks
arbitration. In resisting arbitration before the NASD, the firm typically
argues that the investor is not a "customer;,,35 in resisting arbitration
before the NYSE, the firm argues that the dispute does not involve
"exchange business." 36 These disputes present two questions: (1) who
should decide the arbitrability issue, the courts or the arbitrators, and (2)
how should the arbitrability issue be decided?
The Supreme Court addressed both issues in First Options oj Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan. 37 As to the first issue, the Supreme Court cautioned that
"[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e], evidence that
they did SO.,,38 Because the parties might not have considered the
"rather arcane,,39 question of who would decide the arbitrability issue,
a more explicit expression of intent on this question is necessary so that
unwilling parties are not forced to arbitrate a matter they reasonably
would expect a judge to decide. 40 On the second issue, First Options
affirmed the principle that arbitration agreements are to be interpreted
broadly, and "[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.,,41

35. NASD Rule 1030 I does not define "customer." There are two definitions of "customer" in other
NASD rules: General Provisions Rule 0 120(g) defines "customer" as not including a broker or dealer, Set
NAT'L AsS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, GEN. PROVISIONS, Rule 0120(g), D¢nitions (2003), ll1.'ailnhle at
http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/NAASD_Rules(last visitedJune 26, 2003); Conduct Rule 2270(b) defines
"customer" as "any person who, in the regular course of such member's business, has cash or securities in
the possession of such member," Set NASDCONDUCT2003, supra note 27, Rule 2270(b),Disclosure,!!Finaru:in1
Condition /0 Customers. Set, e.g, Fleet &ston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. "Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770 (8th Cir.
200 I), where the coun relied on the latter rule and found that a company could not arbitrate a dispute
involving advice provided by the firm about a merger.
36. See, e.g., Spear, Leeds & Kellogg \'. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that an alleged victim of a NYSE member's fraud can arbitrate a dispute over "exchange-related
business," even though there is no relationship between \;ctim and firm). Spear, Leeds leaves open whether,
when a NYSE member is accused of wrongdoing, the claim is arbitrable even if it does not arise from
"exchange-related" business. Compare FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02-C4786, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
493 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 13,2003), '!!I'd and rmuuukd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23086 (2d Cir. Nov. 12,2003)
(holding that a buyer of a NYSE member's securities business could not arbitrate a contractual dispute, since
it was not "exchange-related" business).
37. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
38. ld. at 944 (citation omitted).
39. ld. at 945.
40. /d.
41. ld. at 944-45 (quoting J\-Ioses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. \·.IVlercury Const. COlP, 460 U.S. 1,24-25
(1983)).
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I now examine three categories of cases where brokerage firms or
their principals challenge arbitrability: definition of "customer," fraudulent conveyance, and successor-in-interest liability. While courts generally have appropriately adopted an expansive view of arbitrability (with
one notable exception, successor-in-interest liability), it is striking that
courts have decided uniformly (frequendy without discussion) that they,
not arbitrators, decide whether the matter is arbitrable.
Definition of "Customer"
Four recurring fact patterns illustrate difficulties with determining
who is a "customer" under SRO rules: (I) the investor did business with
an "associated person" of the firm, who, instead of opening an account
for the customer with the firm, misappropriated the funds;42 (2) the
investor did business with an "associated person" of the firm, but the dispute did not involve an account or business with the firm;43 (3) the
investor had an account with the firm, but a person who was not
associated with the firm made all the investment decisions;44 (4) the
investor did business with a person who was not associated with the
firm, who in turn transacted business with the firm.45 The courts have
42. Arbitrable: see, e.g., Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1995).
43. Arbitrable: Ste, e.g., WMA Sec. v. Wynn, 32 Fed. Appx. 726, 729 (6th Cir. 2002); Vestax Sec.
Corp. v.l\kWood, 280 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 2002);John Hancock Life Ins. Co. \'. Wilson, 254 F.3d
48,59-60 (2d Cir. 2001); Wash. Square Sec. \'. Hicks, 271 F. Supp. 2d \058 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Jefferson
Pilot Sec. Corp. v. Blankenship, 257 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Wash. Square Sec. \'. Aune,
253 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (W.O. N.C. 2003); MONY Sec. Corp. v. Bomstein, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (M.D.
Fla. 2003); Smith v. Banolini, 2003 WL 21148940 (N.D. III. May 2003); Fin. Network Inv. Corp. v.
Thielbar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14889 (N.D. III. Aug. 2003); Wash. Square Sec. v. Sowers, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1108, 1117-18 (D. Minn. 2002); Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp. v. Brown, 2002 WL 32130291 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
2002); Fin. Network Inv. Corp. v. Becker, 741 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002),qfJ'ti, 762 N.Y.S.2d 25
(N.Y.A.D. I Dept. 2003); BMA Fin. Servo v. Guin, 164 F. Supp. 2d 813, 821 (W.O. La. 200 I); First Montauk
Sec. Corp. v. Four Mile Ranch Dev. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Ha. 1999); Lehman Bros. \'.
Cenified Reponing Co., 939 F. Supp. 1333, 1340-41 (N.D. III. 1996) (decided under NYSE Rule 600);
Royal Alliance Assoc. v. Davis, 897 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Not arbitrable (not enough to be customers of "associated person"; investors must be "customers"
of firm): see, e.g., MONY Sec. Corp. v. Vasquez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ha. 2002); Investors
Capital Corp. v. Brown, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
To some eouns, it depends on whether the customer thought the person was associated with the
firm: see, e.g., Investors Capital Corp. \'. Rimmler, No. 600CV10920RL22DAB, 2001 WL 114936, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2001); WMA Sec. \'. Ruppen, 80 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
In some cases, the firm also asserts that the individual was not an "associated person" of the firm:
see, e.g., I lYnn, 32 I'ed. Appx. 726; Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D.
Ga. 2002).
44. Arbitrable: see, e.g., K.W. Brown & Co. \'. McCutchen, 819 So. 2d 977, 980-81 (Fla. Ct. App.
2002).
45. Not arbitrable: see, e.g., Bensadoun \·.Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003); Brookstreet Sec.
Corp. \'. Bristol Air, Inc., No. C02-0863SI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2002).
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consistently held that situations (1), (2), and (3) are arbitrable because the
investor is considered a "customer" of either the "associated person" or
the firm and that (4) is not arbitrable because the investor is not a
"customer" of either.
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson 46 is one of the few decisions to
provide much discussion of the "who decides" issue. It held that courts
must decide whether an investor is a "customer" in instances where the
investor is invoking arbitration under the arbitration forum's rules and
there is no separate agreement between the parties giving the arbitrators
authority to decide. The court believed that the need for a separate
agreement followed from First Options and the need for "clear and
unmistakable" evidence of the intent to confer this authority on the
arbitrators, lest the unwilling party's "reasonable expectations" that a
court would decide this issue be thwartedY
What are the reasonable expectations of a brokerage firm that does
not wish to arbitrate a claim brought by someone it asserts is not its
customer? In instances where there is a customer agreement between
the investor and the firm, the clear intent of the required language48 is
that arbitrators have full power to decide all issues relating to the claim,
including arbitrability. This, at the least, covers the category (3) cases
above. But beyond this, brokerage firms understand that they are
bound by applicable SRO rules that confer broad authority on the
arbitrators to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions
of the Code. 49 NASD Rule 10106, in particular, prohibits a party from
instituting or prosecuting any litigation against any other party "touching upon any of the matters referred to arbitration. "so
John Hancock recognizes the SROs' authority to require their members
to present arbitrability issues to the arbitrators,sl but maintains that the
language must be found in a 'separate agreement with the other party to
the dispute. This requirement is needlessly formalistic. Given the
clarity of the language in NASD Rule 10106, the securities firms' reasonable expectation should be that the arbitration panels at SRO
forums will decide all issues, including arbitrability, arising from a
dispute with an investor. It is hard to see how, in the case of NASD

46. 254 F.3d 48,57 (2d Cir. 2001).
47. ld. at 55.
48. See discussion supra notes 27·29 and accompanying text.
49. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10324; NYSE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 621.
50. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10106. See UBS PaineWebber, Inc. v. Stone, No. 02·
471,2002 U.S. Dist. LE."IS 5162 at *8 (E.D. La. l\lar. 8, 2002) (refusing firm's request for injunctive relief
in connection with ongoing arbitration because NASD Rule 10106 prohibits the firm from bringing this
action).
.
51. Jolm Htmcock, 254 F.3d at 57.
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arbitrations, there could be any clearer expression of intent than NASD
Rule 10106.
In the main, courts have decided arbitrability issues correctly.
Investors are harmed, nonetheless, by the delay and expense caused
. when firms bring litigation contesting arbitration. In John Hancock, for
example, while the court ultimately ordered the firm to arbitrate claims
commenced by customers of the firm's "associated person" in late 1999
and early 2000, it was not until mid-20m that the Second Circuit issued
its opinion affirming the district court's order compelling arbitration.
Fraudulent Conveyance Claims

It is common in the securities industry for brokerage firms to go out
of business and leave arbitration awards against them unpaid. 52 Investors holding unpaid awards have few options, but if they can establish
that the firm, prior to closing its doors, transferred assets to its principals
to evade creditors, they can bring another arbitration claim against the
defunct firm's principals on fraudulent conveyance grounds. The
difficulties of this option are illustrated in Miller v. Flume,53 where the
investors obtained an $180,000 award against the firm in early 1994.
The firm ceased operations while its motion to vacate the award was
pending, and it did not pay the award when it was confirmed in 1995.
The investors then commenced arbitration against the principals,
charging fraudulent transfer of the defunct firm's assets. The principals,
however, persuaded the federal district court to enjoin the arbitration,
successfully arguing that the investors were no longer customers and that
a fraudulent conveyance claim was not a claim arising in connection
with the firm's securities business. The Seventh Circuit, relying on
NASD Rule 10301, reversed on both grounds. 54 More than two years
after the investors had instituted the second arbitration (and four years
after obtaining the original award), they were finally able to proceed
with their only chance at collection.
Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in finding the matter
arbitrable, it made the same mistake as the John Hancock court and held
that First Options required the court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide
52. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued three reports in four years on
the problem of unpaid securities arbitration awards: SecuriJies Arbitration: Actions .Needed to Address the Problem if
Unpaid Awards, GGD-00-115 (Wash. D.C.June 15,2000); Emluation if Steps Taken to Address the Problem if
UnpaidArbitrationAwards, GAO-01-654R (Wash. D.C. Apr. 27, 2001), and Follow-Up Report on Mat/ers Relating
to SecuriJies Arbitration, GAO-03-162R (Wash. D.C. Apr. 11,2003), all m'ailable at http://www.gao.gov (last
visited June 26, 2003).
53. 139 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1998).
54. See discussion supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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the question of arbitrability. Even though the court recognized that the
language of the NASD Code could be interpreted to confer power on
the arbitrators to decide the question, it did not find the language
sufficiently "clear and unmistakable" to meet the First Options test. 55
Successor-in-Interest Liability Claims
When a brokerage firm discontinues business, another firm may
purchase its business operations with the expectation that the customers
of the transferor firm will move their accounts to the transferee firm.
These transactions are typically structured as a sale of assets, and the
purchase agreements state that the purchaser assumes no liability for
any customers' claims against the seller. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, in some instances, liability may be imposed on the purchaser
based upon common law principles as a successor-in-interest to the
transferor firm. 56 When customers bring arbitrations against successor
firms, the firms frequently seek judicial determination that they cannot
be held liable on this basis, sometimes even after the arbitrators have
already declined to dismiss the claims. Unfortunately, every court save
one that has considered this question has summarily treated this as a
question of arbitrability to be decided by the court. 57 Moreover, unlike
the previous two categories-definition of customer and fraudulent
conveyance claims--the courts have been reluctant to find successor
claims arbitrable.
J1iheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green 58 is the leading case on successor-ininterest liability. Even though the investors had transferred their
accounts to the firm purchasing the assets, the court held that they could

55. A-filler, 139 F.3d at 1134. The court's analysis is also questionable because of its substantial
reliance on pre-Howsam Seventh Circuit precedent holding that courts should decide eligibility rule issues.
56. A court will impose liability on a successor-in-interest theory if( I) the purchaser agreed to assume
the debt, (2) there was a defacto merger of the two corporations, (3) the purchaser was a mere continuation
of the seller, or (4) the transaction was fraudulent. Set Wheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814, 821
(11th Cir. 1993); Ryan Beck & Co. v. Campbell, No. 02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
2,2002).
57. See Grun, 993 F.2d at 819; Ryan Beck & Co. v. Faust, No. 03-CV-636 (W.D. Pa.l\-Iay 7, 2003)
(unpublished opinion on file with author), /mer case 2003 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 15164 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2003);
Campbell, No. 02 C 7016,2002 WL 31696792, at *2, /mer case 2003 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 17428 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
2003); Prudential Sec. v. Bellomo, No. C-97-0020 SI, 1997 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 8775, at *7 (N.D. Cal.June
6,1997); Gruntal & Co. v. Steinberg, 843 F. Supp. 1,9 (D. NJ. 1994),qffd, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994);
Prudential Sec. v. Dusch, No. 93-1 470-IEG (RBB), 1994 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 21623, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
28, 1994). But see Ryan, Beck & Co. v. Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that arbitrators
could decide arbitrability if investors became customers of the successor firm), /mer case 275 F. Supp. 2d 393
(E.D.N.Y.2003).
58. 993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993).
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not demand arbitration as customers under NASD Rule 10301,59
interpreting the rule to apply only to customers of the firm at the time
of the complained-of activity. According to the court, any obligation on
the part of the purchaser firm to arbitrate claims arising under the
seller's accounts had to be found either through interpretation of the
asset purchase agreement or through application of common law
principles, responsibilities that belonged to the courts. 60 Implicit in the
court's reasoning is a skepticism that the arbitrators will get it right.
The court's rationale for interpreting NASD Rule 1030 I to apply
only to customers at the time of the complained-of activity was fair
notice to the firm: "[\'V]e cannot imagine that any NASD member
would have contemplated that its NASD membership alone would
require it to arbitrate claims which arose while a claimant was a
customer of another member merely because the claimant subsequendy
became its customer.,,61 Why is this so unimaginable? In instances
where the investor does not transfer his account, then perhaps Green is
correct that it would be unfair to require the purchaser to arbitrate
claims against someone who was never its customer;62 although a firm
that purchases assets from another firm that is ceasing operations, with
the expectation of taking over its customers' accounts, perhaps should
be on notice that any customer of the defunct firm may pursue a
successor-in-interest arbitration claim against it. But the facts in Green
are stronger than the court concedes because the investors became
customers of the successor firm and alleged that the wrongdoing
continued after the transfer.
The district court in Ryan, Beck & Co., UC v. Fakih,63 in contrast,
arrived at a better decision. It rejected Green's narrow interpretation of
Rule 10301 and held that, as to the investors who transferred their
accounts to the purchaser, the arbitrators would decide the question of
arbitrability. The court, however, refused to extend Rule 1030 I to
encompass claims of an investor who closed his account with the seller
a year before the sale of assets. In the latter instance, the court would
decide whether the investor could arbitrate the claim against the
transferee firm on a successor-in-interest theory.
Green's refusal to allow the arbitrators to decide whether ~o impose
liability on a successor-in-interest theory caused a delay in the arbitra59. Id. at 820; see discussion supra note 32 and accompanying text.
60. /d. at 819 (stating that U[t]he district coun correctly concluded that it should not turn this
responsibility over to the arbitrators".)
61. /d. at 820.
62. The coun in Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210, makes this distinction. The investors in Campbell, No.
02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, and Stdnberg, 854 F. Supp. 324, did not transfer their accounts.
63. 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.n.N.Y.June 23, 2003).

HeinOnline -- 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 426 2003-2004

2003]

SECURITIES ARBITRA TION

427

tion of all claims until conclusion of the firm's lawsuit, which resulted in
the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the arbitrator from hearing
claims prior to the transfer of the account, but allowing arbitration of
the post-transfer claims. Surely any benefit of narrowing the arbitration
claims is not worth the expenditure of judicial resources and the delay
in arbitration. The courts should refer successor-in-interest claims to the
arbitrators and trust them to make the right decision.
Summary
Courts should recognize that SRO rules provide clear expression of
the intent that arbitrators will decide arbitrability issues and that brokerage firms have fair notice that arbitrators will decide these questions.
Judicial resolution of arbitrability issues results in unwarranted delays
(frequently of years) in the submission of the matter to arbitration.
While previously an argument might have been made that courts should
decide arbitrability issues in order to generate precedent,64 there is now
sufficient case law to provide guidance to arbitrators. Indeed, the types
of issues that tend to occur in this area are not legal or policy questions
where judicial involvement would provide added value, but are rather
technical and intensely factual issues best left to the arbitrators, who are
assumedly familiar with the field. 65

Merits-Based Groundsfor Enjoining Securities Arbitrations
Courts have not limited their involvement in ongoing arbitrations to
arbitrability questions. They have also impermissibly enjoined securities
arbitrations on merits-based grounds that should be decided by
arbitrators. In this section, I look at three areas where courts have interfered: dismissal on the merits, res judicata/ collateral estoppel defenses,
and New York's statute of limitations.
Dismissal on the Merits
If a customer brings an arbitration against a firm and the firm
believes it has a complete defense to the customer's complaint, the firm
should raise the defense in the arbitration, in a dispositive motion if

64. The privatization of broker-dealer law and its effect on securities arbitration is discussed in Black
& G ross, supra note 9, at 1013-1030.

65. See, e.g., Bensadoun v.Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding to trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on whether the investors were customers).
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appropriate. 66 On occasion, unfortunately, courts accept the firm's
invitation to decide the case on the merits and enjoin arbitration. In
Merrilll:Jnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Green,67 the firm sought to
enjoin an arbitration brought by a customer who felt aggrieved because
the firm reported suspicious activities in his account to federal authorities without notifying him. Because a federal banking statute expressly
immunized the firm from liability, the court refused to allow the
arbitration to go forward. Similarly, in WFC Commodities Corp. v. Alston,68
the firm was successful in enjoining the customer's arbitration because
the court found that the claim was time-barred under a one-year
limitations period contained in the customer agreement.
Brokerage firms have no right to expect judicial protection from
arbitration. If it is so clear that the defense must prevail, the broker
should win the arbitration expeditiously. Moreover, the risk oflosing
because the decision-maker "got it wrong" is a possibility all parties face
in either arbitration or litigation. Courts that take away legal issues
from the arbitrators reflect an inappropriate suspicion that the arbitrators will not arrive at the right result.
Res J udicatal Collateral Estoppel Defenses
Res judicata or collateral estoppel principles may bar arbitration of
issues previously contested in either litigation or arbitration. In addressing the question of who decides the preclusive effect of a prior judgment
or an arbitration award, courts frequently treat the two questions
differently.
A distinctly minority position is that the preclusive effect of a prior
judgment is a merits-related defense like any other that arbitrators
decide. 69 Most federal courts 70 and some state COUrts,71 however, express

66. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Vennonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 200 I) (holding that arbitrators can
dispose of legal matters on dispositive motions).
67. 936 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (also finding that customer waived his right to arbitrate
by his previous actions).
68. No. OOC0044, 2000 WL 33534178, at * I (N.D. III. I\-lar. 8, 2000) (treating this as an
arbitrability issue, pre-Howsam).
69. See, e.g.,U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1996). Compare
Hooven'. Prudential Sec., No. C-3-0 1-331, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17307 (Aug. 5, 2003)(deciding that its
prior judgment did not bar arbitration, but recognizing that arbitrators may decide this issue under Howsam).
70. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 1998);ln re Y
& A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So. 2d 158, 16364 (Ala. 2001), cer/. denied, 535 U.S. 987 (2002).

HeinOnline -- 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 428 2003-2004

2003]

SECURITIES ARBITRA TION

429

a strong policy to protect their own judgments; accordingly, only the
court rendering the judgment should determine its preclusive effect.
Some courts similarly believe that the preclusive effect of a prior
arbitration award is an issue so important that only courts can decide
it.72 The better view, however, is that since the institutional concerns
raised when the prior decision is ajudgment are absent in this situation,
there is no reason to treat the preclusive effect of prior arbitration
awards differently from any other merits-based defense. Because the
SRO rules give broad authority to arbitrators to decide all issues, the
courts should not involve themselves in a matter that the panel in an
ongoing arbitration can resolve. 73
New York Statute of Limitations

Howsam made clear that ordinarily arbitrators decide procedural
issues like statute of limitations. 74 IIi New York, however, the state
arbitration statute provides that a party to an arbitration may ask the
court to determine if arbitration is barred by the statute oflimitations. 75
While the statute by its terms does not take away the arbitrators' power
to decide the issue as well, New York's highest court has stated that
under New York law "statutory time limitations . . . as opposed to
contractual time limitations agreed upon by the parties-are for the
courts, not the arbitrators" to decide. 76 Two district courts have
addressed the issue of whether firms, by including in their customer
agreements a New York choice oflaw clause specifically applicable to
arbitration,77 can require judicial resolution of statute of limitations
issues, and reached different results.

72. Set, e.g., Waterfront Marine Constr., Inc. v. N. End 4gers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, Band
C, 251 Va. 417,433 (1996). Many courts do not pro~ide any explanation of why they, instead of the arbitrators, should decide preclusion issues, see, e.g., Tucker Anthony v. Baird, 12 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D.D.C. 1998).
73. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, 207 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Otick,
151 F.3d at 140; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 135
(2d Cir. 1996); Bd. of Ed. of Patchogue-I\Iedford Union Free Sch. Dis!. v. Patchogue-Medford Congo of
Teachers, 399 N.E.2d 1143, 1144 (N.Y. 1979).
74. 537 U.S. 79,84 (2002).
75. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7502(b), 7503(a) (McKinney 2003).
76. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (N.Y. 1995); but see Smith
Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Sacha row, 689 N.E.2d 884, 889 (N.Y. 1997) Oimiting Luc~ie to choice-of-Iaw
provisions that are applicable to both the contract's construction and its enforcement).
77. After Mastrobuono, a general New York choice-of-Iaw clause in the customer agreement is not
sufficient to invoke the New York Rule. See, e.g., Shaw Group v. Triplefine InCI Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 12325 (2d Cir. 2003); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1996).
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In Coleman & Co. Securities v. Giaquinto FamilY Trust, 78 the customer
agreement provided that "[a]ny arbitration under this agreement shall
be conducted pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the laws of
the State of New York.,,79 The court found no ambiguity in the
language and interpreted it to mean that New York's arbitration statute
was applicable. 80 It also held, relying on Volt and Mastrobuono, that the
FAA did not preempt the state statute, since the central purpose of the
FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms. 8l
In contrast, another district court, in Dean Witter Rf!)molds, Inc. v.
Sanchez Espada,82 found language in a customer agreement insufficiendy
clear to warrant application of the New York rule, even though, unlike
Coleman, the choice oflaw provision contained in the arbitration clause
referred specifically to the statute of limitations issue: "The law of the
State of New York will apply in all respects, including but not limited to
determining of applicable statutes of limitation and available
remedies.,,83 The court found this language "murky" and the firm's
interpretation of it "strained," particularly since the agreement
contained the NASD-required language that "[t]he parties are waiving
their right to seek remedies in court. ,,84
The Sanchez Espada court has the better argument in terms of contract
interpretation. There. is not just ambiguity, but a direct conflict,
between the waiver of a judicial remedies clause and the New York
choice oflaw clause, if the latter is interpreted to authorize the firm to
seek judicial determination of the statute of limitations issues. The
NASD has made it clear that a firm's contractual assertion of the New
York rule conflicts and contravenes the waiver of judicial remedies
clause. 85
In sum, decisions in these three areas-fraudulent conveyance claims,
res judicata/collateral estoppel defenses, and New York statute of
limitations defenses-demonstrate that courts frequendy interfere with

78. No. 00 CIV. 1632,2000 \YL 1683450, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2000),lalerdecision, 236 F. Supp.
2d 288, 293 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) (finding customer's claims time-barred).
79. Colmum, No. 00 CIV. 1632 (DC), 2000 WL 1683450, at *1.
80. Id. at *4.
81. /d. at *3.
82. 959 F. Supp. 73 (D.P.R. 1997).
83. Id. at 75.
84. Id. at 82; see also supra notes 27·29 and accompanying text.
85. "[TJhe use of a governing law clause or other clause anywhere within a customer agreement that
thwarts any NASD arbitration provision will be deemed violative." NASD Notice to l'vlembers 95-16,supra
note 29, at *2.
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ongoing arbitrations and take away from the arbitrators issues that they
should properly decide.
PART THREE

Increasingly, brokerage firms and individual brokers seek to vacate
arbitration awards in favor of customers, 86 even though federal and state
courts articulate an extremely deferential standard of review of arbitrators' awards, stating that courts should vacate arbitrators' awards only
in very unusual circumstances. 87 Because the statutory grounds for
vacatur do not lend themselves to broad interpretation, firms frequently
assert that the arbitrators "manifestly disregarded the law," a nonstatutory ground for vacatur. Many courts recognize "manifest disregard" as a basis for vacatur, although to date they seldom vacate awards
on this ground.
The industry's persistence in making vacatur motions on dubious
grounds presents two problems. First, when firms and brokers consistently make motions to vacate, the potential exists for overly intrusive
judicial review, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive for finality.88
Second, in some instances firms and brokers are making frivolous
motions to vacate in order to delay payment to the customer or even to
extort a lower payment in settlement. The judiciary should not provide
assistance to practices that breach a broker's duty to deal fairly with its
customers.

Standard ofJudicial Review ofArbitration Awards
Judicial review of arbitration awards in the federal courts is "very
limited."89 Courts "do not sit to hear claims offactual or legal error by
an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions oflower

86. A comprehensive survey of motions to vacate securities arbitration awards from 1988-2000 shows
an increase in industry challenges from 33% to 51 % and suggests that challenges may increase because of
increased application of the manifest disregard standard. Richard P. Ryder ,SecuriJies Arbitration 2000, T odf!Y's
Trends, Predictions for Tomorrow, SECURITIF.S ARBITRATION 2000, at 1141, 1171 (PU 2000).
87. See, e.g., first Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Hackett v. Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 102 (N.Y. 1995).
88. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,85 (2002).
89. Alberti v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 205 F.3d 1321,2000 WL 19090, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000)
(unpublished opinion) (quoting Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103
F.3d 9,12 (2d Cir. 1997). For similar language, see, e.g., Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir.
2000); Spicuzza v. Sec. Serv. Network, 32 Fed. Appx. 327, 328 (9th Cir. 2002); Cohig & Assoc. v. Stamm,
149 F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 339472, at *2 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion); Davis v. Prudential Sec.,
Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995).
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COUrts.,,90 Furthermore, "OJimiting judicial review is necessary to
encourage the use of arbitration as an alternative to ... litigation" and
to achieve the "'twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.",91 The disappointed party should not be able to circumvent the parties' agreement
to have an arbitrator decide the dispute "by the back door" of appellate
review. 92 State courts have similarly expressed a strong public policy in
favor of finality under their state arbitration statutes. 93
Procedural Grounds
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth four process-based
grounds for vacating an award. 94 The first two involve a corrupt
process95 or a corrupt arbitrator. 96 The third addresses serious procedural errors,97 and the fourth, somewhat cryptically, allows for vacatur
"[wJhere the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.,,98 The statute also allows for correcting an award for mechanical or transcription errors. 99
Brokers frequently attempt to vacate awards because the arbitrators
refused their requests to postpone a scheduled hearing lOO or refused to

90. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6,8 (I st Cir. 1990) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
91. Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Folkways Music
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, III (2d Cir. 1993)).
92. Baravati v.Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
93. See, e.g., Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 102 (N.v. 1995),
Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. App. Oiv. 1992).
94. 9 U.S.C. § lO(a)(1-4) (2003).
95. [d. at (a)(I) ("[w] here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means").
96. /d. at (a)(2) ("[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them"). See also Montez v. Prudential Sec., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 200 I) (holding that arbitrator
partiality is not established by an arbitrator's undisclosed past associations with the law firm representing one
of the parties, dating back five years); Mariner Fin. Group v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002) (holding
that the arbitrator's failure to disclose that the customer's expert witness had previously testified against him
presented factual issues as to his partiality).
97. 9 U .S.C. § I 0(a)(3)("[w]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced").
98. /d. at (a)(4).
99. 9 U.S.C. § I I(c) (2003).
100. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Testerman, 165 F.3d 911, 1998 WL 795194 at **2 (4th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished opinion); Bisno/fv. King, 154 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (S.O.N.Y. 2001); Morrow v.Jersey Capital
l'vlarkets Group, Inc., No. 90 CIV.5305 (RPP), 1995 WL 70630, at *2 (S.O.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1995). One
notorious firm, Stratton Oakmont, and its principals have unsuccessfully made this argument in numerous
district court opinions, including Shamoh v. Sclu.oeiger, 21 F. Supp. 2d 208, 211 (E.O.N.V. 1998), and Card v.
Stratton Oakmont, 933 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Minn. 1996).
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hear some of the proffered evidence, 101 but courts rarely vacate awards
on these grounds. Arbitrators have broad· discretion in managing the
arbitration process, and procedural defects are not grounds for vacating
an award so long as the arbitration process was "fundamentally fair." 102
Courts have also resisted efforts to interpret broadly the statutory
ground that the arbitrators "so imperfecdy executed [their powers] that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made."103 For example, the Seventh Circuit found that the
statutory requirements of finality and definiteness were "more of form
than ... substance:,,104 the judge must confirm the award so long as he
or she can determine that the arbitrators decided the dispute and what
the resolution was. 105
Similarly, challenges to awards on the ground that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers are seldom successful. So long as the process was
fundamentally fair, courts will confirm the award. lOG A few courts,
however, have improperly used this ground to review the merits of a
dispute. In Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bulls~e Securities, Inc., 107 an intraindustry dispute, the claimant firm alleged damages resulting from
negligence on the part of the respondent firm's employee. Because the

101. See, e.g., Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp., No. CIV.A 97-A-MC-0053, 1998 WL 48557 at
*2, 10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2,1998) (finding that arbitrator's comment that he would throw cases in the "trash" did
not, in context, warrant vacatur); Steiner v. Glenn, No. 00 C 7645, 2002 WL 31133197, at *3 (N.D. III. Feb.
2,2002).
102. See, t.g., Bowles fin. Groupv. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013(lOth Cir. 1994); Hayne,
Miller & Fami, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949,952 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Plank V. Vision Ltd. P'ship, No. 02
C 4453, 2003 WL 76864, at *2 (N.D. III.Jan. 9, 2003) (holding that a charge that the award was obtained
through petjured or prejudicial testimony is not a basis for challenging that award, as it amounts to
impermissible review of the arbitrator's assessment of the evidence or witnesses' credibility).
103. 9 U.S.C. § lO(a)(4) (2003).
104. IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001).
105. /d. at 650-51.
106. See, e.g., Gibbons V. Smith, 67 Fed. Appx. 52, 55, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11548, (2d Cir. 2003)
(unpublished opinion) (confirming proceeding against absent broker who recei"ed notice of arbitration
pursuant to SRO rules); In re Beckman v. Greentree Sec., 663 N.E.2d 886, 889-90 (N.Y. 1996) (to same
effect); Sheldon V. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (confirming award that granted
dispositive motion after telephonic hearing); Ashraf". Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (confirming award where the broker had no opportunity to respond to a new theory of
damages introduced in customer's post-hearing brief); Young V. Alagna, No. CIV.A3:99-CV-2309G, 2000
WL 472863, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2000) (confirming award where the broker was reinstated as a
respondent after he did not appear to testify as customer's witness pursuant to an agreement). A rare
instance of a court's vacating a customer's award on procedural grounds is N.E. N.Y. Dist. Council
Pipefitters Welfare Fund, Local 773 v. Calapa (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County Nov. 21, 2002) (unpublished
opinion on file with author). The broker believed that the firm's attorney was also representing him, but the
firm had settled with the customer and apparently had not notified the broker, who received no notice about
the hearing. The court found the arbitrators acted improperly in going forward with the arbitration without
inquiring about the absence of the broker.
107. 738 N.Y.S.2d 27 (App. Di\,. 2002).
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statement of claim asserted only corporate claims, the court vacated an
award in favor of the claimant firm's owners. 108 If the court had simply
remanded the matter to the arbitrators for clarification or correction of
this matter, the vacatur would be unobjectionable. The court, however,
went further and found the award "inherently inconsistent" and
"irrational" because it found no basis to impose liability on the respondent firm since the arbitrators specifically denied the claims against the
allegedly negligent employee. 109
"Manifest Disregard of the Law"
The Supreme Court, in Wilko v. Swan, 110 referred to a non-statutory
basis for vacatur, "manifest disregard ofthe law," without identifYing the
source of this standard. Although Rodriguez overruled Wilko, the Court
subsequently referred to the manifest disregard standard as applicable
to arbitration awards, again without explanation, in First Options qf
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan. III The manifest disregard standard, with its
dubious origins, conflicts with the policy that the arbitrators' decision is
final so long as the parties received a fair hearing. I 12 Nevertheless,
almost every circuit recognizes some formulation ofa manifest disregard
standard in the context of securities arbitration awards, and many state
courts have also adopted the manifest disregard standard under their
state arbitration statutes. Courts consistently state that the manifest
disregard standard is extremely narrow and "means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law.,,113 There is a strong
presumption that the arbitrator has not acted in manifest disregard of
the law. I 14
There are, however, degrees of narrowness. The Seventh Circuit
confines vacatur to awards that direct the parties to violate the law,115
and the Fifth Circuit to awards that "would result in significant injus-

108. /d. at 28.
J09. /d. at 29.
110. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), ovmuled I[y Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearsonl American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
III. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
112. The California Supreme Court provides a clear statement of this policy in MonchflTsch v. Heily &
Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992), discussed infta note 128 and accompanying text.
113. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
114. See, e.g., Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co, 304 F.3d 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002), a nonsecurities arbitration case that the Second Circuit subsequently referred to, in a securities arbitration context,
as providing "an extensive and comprehensive recapitulation of [its] case law" on this point. Thc GJ\·IS
Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2003).
115. See, e.g., Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001).
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tice.,,116 Unfortunately, however, most circuits allow a slightly more
expansive review,just enough so that a firm could avoid sanctions for a
frivolous vacatur motion. 117
Currently applied, the manifest disregard standard does not allow for
vacatur simply because the arbitrators misapplied the law. Rather, the
test is designed to correct situations where the arbitrators "willfully
flouted" the governing law. IIB The Second Circuit's two-prong test,
with "both an objective and subjective component," demonstrates the
difficulty in convincing a court to vacate an award under this
standard. "9 First, the party seeking vacatur must establish that the law
to be applied is "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.,,'20 Its
applicability to the dispute must be "obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve
as an arbitrator.,,'21 Second, the party seeking vacatur must show that
the arbitrator "appreciate [d] the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.,,122 Courts
may find intentional disregard if the arbitrators' reasoning "strains
credulity.,,'23 Other circuits have adopted similar tests. 124

116. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Macneil, Speidel,
& Stipanowich, 4 FEDERAL ARBITRATION L\W §40. 7.2.6 at 40:95 (Supp. 1999)).

117. See, e.g., Al-Azhari v.I\Ierit Capital Assoc., NO. 99 CIV. 9795 (LAK), 2000 WL 151914, at *3
(S.D.N.V. Feb. 14,2002) (denying customer's Rule II motion for sanctions since fi'rm's manifest disregard
argument was weak, but "not wholly frivolous").
118. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 217; see also Bobker, 808 F.2d at 936-37 (finding no "manifest disregard"
where the arbitrators did not follow the SEC's interpretation of its rule, since the record showed that the
arbitrators carefully considered the rule's rationale).
119. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209. In HalJigan v. Piper Jriffr'!!, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998),
where a former employee charged the firm with age discrimination, the Second Circuit articulated an
additional "manifest disregard of the facts" standard; Benderson, however, stated that Halligan did not create
an additional basis for vacatur, 326 F.3d at 80.
120. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 934).
121. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933).
122. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933); see also DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1997)(confirming a 5200,000 award to a former employee that
did not include attorney's fees, although the relevant statute required an award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing party, since the record did not establish that the attorney made the arbitrators aware of the law).
123. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 218 (citation omitted).
124. In the First Circuit, the disappointed party must show that the award is "( I) unfounded in reason
and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group ofjudges, ever could conceivably
have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact."
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (lstCir. 1990). More succinctly, it requires "some showing in the
record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it." Id.
at 10 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has adopted similar language;see Cohig & Assoc., v. Stamm, 149
F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 339472, at"3 (10th Cir. 1998). According to the Fourth Circuit, the party seeking
vacatur must show that "the arbitrators were aware of the law, understood it correctly, found it applicable
to the case before them, and yet choose to ignore it in propounding their decision." Remmey v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Similarly, in the Sixth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, to find manifest disregard, the relevant law must be "clearly defined and not subject to
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In most securities arbitrations, the arbitrators do not state reasons in
the award. Because of the strong presumption in favor of confirming
awards, courts should uphold these awards so long as any colorable-or
even "slighdy colorable"-justification supports them. 125 Courts cannot
permit the deposition of an arbitrator in order to ascertain his or her
thought processes in arriving at a decision. 126 If the court can find any
"legally plausible" line of argument to support the award, it must be
confirmed. 127 This may not be as easy for judges to do as it sounds; it
may require them both to examine the hearing record to determine
what facts the arbitrators could have found and to consider the relevant
law. As some opinions demonstrate, judges can devote considerable
effort to assure themselves that they can confirm the award, even in
some instances remanding the award to the arbitration panel for
clarification. 128
State courts also restrict judicial review of arbitration awards under
their state arbitration statutes in varying degrees. California illustrates
the most restrictive standard. It limits judicial review of arbitration
awards to the statutory grounds and does not recognize the manifest
disregard standard, reasoning that the risk of arbitrator mistake is
acceptable in light of the judicial review available for arbitrator
corruption or serious misconduct. 129 New York takes an intermediate
position, recognizing limited non-statutory grounds in addition to the

reasonable debate," and the arbitrators must have consciously chosen not to apply it. Dawahare \'. Spencer,
210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see alm Spicuzza V. Sec. Serv. Network, 32 Fed. Appx.
327,2002 WL 460249, at *1 (9th Cir. 2002); Montes V. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th
Cir. 1997) (in the award the arbitrators noted the attorney's plea to disregard the law and did not repudiate
it).
Some Circuits have articulated additional or alternative tests: "completely irrational," see Hruban
v. Steinman, 40 Fed. Appx. 723, 724 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and "arbitrary and capricious," see
Brown V. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Because the
Supreme Court has not recognized these tests, they are of even more suspect validity than "manifest
disregard." For discussion of them, see Stephen L. Hayford, A .Nw Paradigm for CtmIlTIn'cial ArbiJraJion:
RL/hinl.-ing the RLlationship between RLasoned Awards and IheJudicial Standardfor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
443,489-92 (1998).
125. Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 218.
126. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003).
127. l\Ierrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995).
128. See, e.g., Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding to panel for
clarification of the grounds for imposing liability on the CEO); Tripi V. Prudential Sec., 2003 'WL 22208351
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2003) (remanding award for clarification because it awarded customer only three per cent
of his losses); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2003) (remanding for
explanation of punitive damages award court viewed as excessive). For Sawtelle's subsequent history, see infta
note 159.
129. See Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Cal. 1992); see also Nohre v. W J.
Gallagher & Co., No. B151769, 2002 WL 31424914, at *4 (Cal. App. Oct. 30, 2002) (confirming an award
in favor of the customer and awarding attorneys fees because of the firm's frivolous motion to vacate).
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statutory grounds. 130 The arbitrators' decisions on issues ofiaw and fact
are "conclusive,,131 unless the award is "totally irrational or violative of
a strong public policy." 132 Finally, Illinois is an example of a state that
has adopted manifest disregard in addition to the statutory grounds. 133
Because there are many unsettled legal questions in federal and state
securities law,134 and because most questions oflegalliability tum upon
sometimes complicated issues offact, including witness credibility, there
are very few arbitrations involving customer-broker disputes where the
broker could demonstrate that the arbitrators willfully flouted governing
law. 135 To the contrary, in the typical customer-broker dispute,
arbitrators hear conflicting evidence that could support a decision for
either party.136 Consequently, as the Supreme Court stated in First
Options, only in "very unusual circumstances" should a court vacate an
award. 137 Case law bears this out. 138 I have found only a handful 139 of
awards vacated in customer-broker arbitrations on manifest disregard
grounds, and most of them at the instance of the broker. Recently,

130. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511 (l\kKinney 2003).
131. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 674 N.E.2d 1349,
1354 (N.Y. 1996).
132. Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N. Y. I 995)(quoting Maross
Constr. v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 488 N.E.2d 67, 70 (N.Y. 1985)). Some lower courts have,
however, also adopted "manifest disregard" as a standard. See, t.g., UBS Warburg LLC v. Auerbach, Pollack
& Richardson, Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 2002) (finding that the arbitrators "overtly
disregarded" an SEC rule and "did not merely misinterpret it").
133. See Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Zielinski, 713 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ill. App. 1999). The Georgia
legislature became the first to amend its arbitration statute to include manifest disregard as a statutory
ground for vacatur, see 2003 Ga. Laws 363, amending GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b).
134. E.g., controlling person liability, liability of clearing firms to retail customers, definition of
recommendation. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 992-93.
135. See Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002).
136. See, e.g., Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 1994).
137. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
138. I focused my research on opinions deciding motions to vacate customer-broker awards in federal
and selected state (New York, California, Florida, and Illinois) courts fromJanuary 1995 to present. While
I do not claim that my survey is exhaustive, it is sufficient to illustrate current trends.
139. Several recent instances where brokers obtained vacatur or remand are discussed subsequently:
Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), discussed mfta notes 141-147 and accompanying
text; Tacher v. Parsons, 98 CV 4482 aM) (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2000) (unpublished opinion on file with author),
discussed mfta note 147; and Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003), discussed mfta
notes 218-19 and accompanying text. See also Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. May, Civ. Act. No. 3:02-CV-688-S
(W.O. Ky. Aug. 19,2003) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (vacating award in favor of customer
as to two common law claims because customer had dismissed all claims except those based on the state
securities statute). A recent instance where a customer obtained vacatur on non-statutory grounds isBrahham
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 265 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725-26 (S.D. Miss. 2003), where the court found a damages
award of approximately S 125,000 "arbitrary and capricious" because there was no "reasonable factual basis
in the record" for the award. The firm claimed that there were no damages, and the customer's expert
testified that damages were at least S500,000. See also Tripi v. Prudential Sec., 2003 WL 22208351 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 2003), discussed supra note 128.
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however, some courts have begun to refer awards back to the arbitration
panels for clarification or explanation, with a clear implication that the
court may vacate the award on manifest disregard grounds ifit finds the
panel's explanation unconvincing. l40
The existence ofthe manifest disregard standard is dangerous because
it gives judges an invitation to review the merits of an award and throw
it out when they believe that the arbitrators wrongly decided the dispute.
Wallace v. Buttar141 illustrates the dangers of judicial review under this
standard. In that case, two investors charged that their broker made
fraudulent misrepresentations, inducing them to purchase large blocks
of stocks in two companies for which the broker's firm acted as the
placement agent. The president and two director-shareholders of the
now defunct firm l42 were successful in vacating an award that, in
addition to imposing liability on the individual broker, found the other
three individuals "liable for fraud and also as 'Control Persons'" under
both federal and state securities laws. 143 The district court reviewed the
evidence and found none that showed that the president and the two
director-shareholders knew of the fraudulent activity-a requirement,
in the view of the court, for controlling person liability. 144 The court did
not believe that the evidence established the requisite intent, largely
because the president was president in name only and supervision of the
operations was delegated to another employee. 145
The district court was probably wrong on the merits as to the
controlling person liability, but, more importantly, its scope of review of
the arbitration award was unduly intrusive. There is nothing in the
opinion to suggest that there were any procedural deficiencies in the
arbitration hearing, no evidence to suggest that the arbitrators were
corrupt or even incompetent or confused. Moreover, the Second
Circuit's "manifest disregard" test was not met under either prong: 146
the law on controlling person liability is by no means well-defined, and
there was no evidence that the arbitrators intended to flout the law. At
most, the arbitrators may have stretched the law on controlling person
liability to arrive at the conclusion that a person who holds himself out
as president and the two shareholder/directors who brought the

14Q. Seesupra note 128.
141. 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
142. The award was vacated as to all three individuals, although it appears that only the president
actively prosecuted the motion to vacate, and most of the court's analysis focuses on the involvement of the
president.
143. Wallace, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
144. ld. at 396.
145. ld. at 394-95.
146. See discussion supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
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transactions in question to the firm are responsible for the losses suffered
by defrauded investors of the defunct firm. The parties received the
arbitration they were entided to, and those disappointed with the result
should not have been given a second chance to argue their case before
the district court. 147

W7ry are Firms Bringing Motions to Vacate?
Even though motions to vacate arbitration awards in customer-broker
disputes are rarely successful, there is a perception among investors'
attorneys that firms increasingly are fIling them. In this section I look
at reasons why firms bring vacatur motions. I also argue that brokers
violate the duty of fair dealing that they owe their customers (including
former customers) when they bring motions to vacate to delay payment
of awards. Finally, I propose reforms to deal with the problem.
Manifest disregard is intended to address a form of arbitrator
misconduct, not to provide judicial illumination on unsetded or cuttingedge legal questions. Nevertheless, brokers frequendy seek vacatur on
manifest disregard grounds where there is scant controlling legal
authority. Awards in this category include those allowing customers of
the introducing broker to recover damages from the clearing firm, 148
allowing clients of an investment advisor to recover damages from the
broker,149 awarding damages to a "day-trader,,,15o and allowing an
institutional investor engaged in "desperate speculation" to recover
when the broker provided no investment advice. 151 In all these cases,
the arbitration awards were confirmed. Brokers have so frequendy
challenged awards of punitive damages and attorney's fees that these
categories warrant more detailed analysis.

147. Wallace, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 397. For another misapplication of the manifest disregard standard,
see Tacher v. Parsons, 98 CV 4482 01\1) (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2000) (unpublished opinion on file with author),
where the court vacated an award of approximately S 1.4 million. Even though it correctly stated the two·
prong test that requires finding the arbitrators flouted the law," the court found only that the panel
apparently committed a "gross error" in applying South Carolina law of damages when the customer
agreement contained a New York choice oflaw clause.
148. See, e.g., Koruga v. Fisef\' Correspondent Sef\'" 40 Fed. Appx. 364, 366 (9th Cir. 2002); McDaniel
v. Bear Steams & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); RPR Clearing, a Div. of Rauscher
Pierce Refsnes, v. Glass, No. 97 CIV.0017 JSM, 1997 WL460717, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.July 28, 1997); Cohen
v.J.B. Oxford & Co., No. C-I-02-57I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21177, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2002).
149. See, e.g., Bear Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 23 Fed. Appx. 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2001).
150. See, e.g., Rosati v. Bekhor, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 200 I).
151. See, e.g., Investors Equity Life Ins. Co. of Hawaii v. ADM Inv. Sef\'" I Fed. Appx. 709, 1997 WL
33100645, at *9, II (D. Haw. Dec. 15, 1997), <!I1'd, I Fed. Appx. 709,2001 WL 32048 (9th Cir.Jan. 12,
2001).
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One constant over the years has been the efforts of brokerage firms
to vacate customers' awards containing punitive damages; only their
arguments have changed. Pre-Mastrobuono,152 brokers argued that
.arbitrators did not have the authority to award punitive damages under
applicable state law. Post-Mastrobuono, brokers continued their efforts to
. vacate punitive damages awards on manifest disregard grounds, 153 either
because the applicable statute did not authorize them 154 or because the
evidence did not support them. 155 Since Mastrobuono, these efforts have
been consistendy unsuccessful.
Mter BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,156 in which the Supreme
Court held that there are due process limits on punitive damages verdicts, brokers have sought to vacate "excessive" punitive damages
awards on constitutional grounds. Most courts have rejected this argument, finding no "state action" present in SRO arbitrations l57 and
noting that the limited scope ofjudicial review of arbitration awards is
incompatible with the Gore analysis. 158 A recent New York state court
opinion, however, vacated a punitive damages award as excessive in a
non-customer securities arbitration context. 159 While finding no constitutional constraint, the court looked to the Gore factors to find that the
152. See discussion supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g.,R. Allen Fox, Ltd. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. 93 C 2228, 1996 WL 288771, at *2
(N.D. III. May 29, 1996); Greening v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. C-95-4288 SI, 1996 WL 61095, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1996), '!I1'd, No. 96-15370, 113 F.3d 1241, 1997 'II'L 222341 (unpublished opinion;
affirmed as to individual respondent); Commonwealth Assoc. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)
154. See, e.g., Sav-A-Tripv. Belfort, 164 F.3d 1137, I 139-40 (8th Cir. 1999); Bamesv. Logan, 122 F.3d
820,823 (9th Cir. \997); R.C. Layne Constr. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 651 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (App. Div.
1996); Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Neurosurgical Assoc. oflnd. 896 F. Supp. 844, 848 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
Wilson v. Sterling Foster & Co., No. 98 C 2733, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16913, at *19 (N.D. III. Oct. 15,
1998 );Jeppsen v. Piper,Jalfray & Hopwood, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Utah 1995).
155. See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. of Springfield & Clark County v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d
863,876 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
156. 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct.
1513, 1524-26 (2003) (holding that 5145 milli~n punitive damages award on 51 million compensatory
damages violated due process).
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., 59 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that "the federal
policy favoring arbitration, as well as the absence of the bias and runaway punitive awards prevalent in the
jury context, distinguish the arbitral award ... from the jury award of punitive damages"); Olde Discount
Corp. v. Dartley, No. 604507/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 726, at *17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 1997).
158. See l\Iorgan Keegan & Co. v. Lalonde, No. CIV. A. 00-2520, 200 I WL 43600, at * I (E.D. La.
Jan. 16,2001).
159. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 273-74 (App. Div. 2003). The court
also remanded the matter to the panel for reconsideration of punitive damages. The panel subsequently
issued a "revised" award that awarded the same amount of punitive damages that the court found excessive.
See Susanne Craig, Panel RnnstnJes Prmitive Award Against lVaddel4 WAll. ST.j., Sept. 8, 2003, C-5. The court
again vacated the punitive damages award and directed a new panel to consider the issue. Sawtelle v.
Waddell & Reed, Inc., Index No. 115056/0 I (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 22,2004) (unpublished opinion on file with
author).
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punitive damages were excessive and therefore in manifest disregard of
the law. This opinion, unfortunately, will only encourage firms to
persist in their challenges to punitive damages awards in customer cases.
Brokers frequendy seek to vacate awards of attorney's fees to customers on the ground that the "American rule" does not permit the award
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party without statutory authority. 160
Most courts have upheld these awards, reasoning that the arbitrators'
broad discretion in determining remedies includes awarding attorney's
fees. 161 In an anomalous decision in an intra-industry securities arbitration award, a New York state court found that the arbitrators exceeded
their powers in awarding attorney's fees since the parties' agreement
only provided that the other party could recover them. 162 Again, it
would be unfortunate if this encouraged firms to continue to challenge
awards of attorney's fees.
Given the inapplicability of the manifest disregard standard to
cutting-edge issues, as demonstrated by the courts' consistent rejection
of it, brokers should not continue to challenge awards in similar circumstances. If the firm wishes judicial determination of its liability, it should
negotiate with the customer for judicial resolution of the dispute in lieu
of arbitration.
Brokers apparendy challenge some customers' awards simply because
they believe that the arbitrators reached the wrong result. In The GMS
Group, ILC v. Benderson,163 the arbitration panel awarded the customer
$150,000, a modest recovery considering the customer claimed approximately $1.5 million in losses. The firm nevertheless brought an
unsuccessful motion to vacate for the purpose, as the Second Circuit
noted, of rearguing the disputed factual and legal issues. In response to
the firm's argument that where federal statutory rights were involved the
Second Circuit's deferential standard was inappropriate, the court tardy

160. See, e.g., WI\.fA Sec. v. Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833, 839 (S.D. Ohio 2000), r!fJ'd, 32 Fed. Appx.
726,730 (6th Cir. 2002); Waddle v. LT Lawrence & Co., No. 98 C 5015, 1998 WL 901687, at *5 (N.D. III.
Dec. 17, 1998).
161. See. e.g., Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, 336 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2003); Bialecki v. Patterson
Travis, Inc., No. 00C5520, 2001 WL 333076, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2001); Mutual Servo Corp. \".
Spaulding, 972 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (N.D. III. 1997); RAS Sec. Corp. \ .. Williams, 674 N.Y.S.2d 303,303
(App.Div. 1998) (imposing Rule II sanctions for frivolous vacatur motion). Bul Sf' Quick & Reilly, Inc. \".
Zielinski, 306 Ill. App.3d 93 (1999) (vacating award of attorney's fees because arbitrators exceeded their
power). Where the agreement does not provide for attorney's fees, florida requires the arbitration award
to provide the basis for awarding them and judicial determination of entitlement. See Moser v. Barron Chase
Sec., 783 So. 2d 231, 237 (fla. 2001).
162. UBS Warburg LLC \". Auerbach, Pollack & Richardson, Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 364, 364-65 (App.
Div. 2002). The coun also vacated the award of damages because it found "manifest disregard" of the SEC's
net capital rule.
163. 326 F.3d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).

HeinOnline -- 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441 2003-2004

442

UNIVERSITY OF CLNCLNNATI IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72

.observed that "any solicitousness the [Supreme] Court has expressed for
a party's substantive rights in arbitration was on behalf of claimants under
federal statutes, not defendants like GMS.,,164
Wallace v. Buttar165 is another example where a firm sought (and
received) a second chance to argue the issue of controlling person
liability.166 Other instances where brokers were re-arguing the merits
are listed in the footnote. 167
The FAA confers power on courts to review arbitration awards for
the limited purpose of assuring that the parties received a fair hearing,
not to afford the disappointed party another opportunity to argue the
merits. A firm is abusingjudicial resources and violating the customer
agreement's commitment that arbitration is final and binding when it
brings a vacatur motion to get a second chance to argue the merits.
Finally, and most disturbingly, some firms appear to use motions to
vacate simply to delay paying awards or to exert "economic coercion"
on the customer. 168 Customers' attorneys have reported that brokers are

164. /d. at 80.
165. See discussion supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
166. See also Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec. LLC, 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussedinfta at notes

218-219 and accompanying text); Deciccio v. Columbo, 234 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322-23 (S.D.N.V. 2002)
(confirming award where employees of a defunct firm challenged control person liability); Donald & Co.
Sec., Inc. v.Jones, 704 N.Y.S.2d 242, 242 (App. Div. 2000) (confirming award where the firm argued it
could not be found liable since no liability imposed on its employees); Yen v. Brown, No. 3:01-CV-2578-L,
2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7350, at ·4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2002), amended 0/2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7665 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 29, 2002) (confirming award where individual broker asserted no personal involvement in fraud).
167. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)
(firm argued statute of limitations defense); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Millar, 274 F. Supp.
2d 70 I (W.O. Pa. 2003) (confirming customer's award and observing that even if court would have decided
the ratification issue differently, there was no basis to find manifest disregard); Daugherty v. Wash. Square
Sec., 271 F. Supp. 2d 681 (W.O. Pa. 2003) (confirming award despite firm's assertion investor was not a
"customer"); Weiss, Peck & Greer v. Robinson, 2003 WL 1396436 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2003) (confirming
customer's award even though she signed a general release); Universidad Interamericana v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 151,154 (D. P.R. 2002) (statute oflimitations);Janney l\Iontgomery Scott
Inc. v. Oleckna, No. CIV.A.99-4307, 2000 WL 623231, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2000)(arbitrators awarded
more in damages than value of customer's account); Rosenbaum v. Imperial Capital, 169 F. Supp. 2d 400,
414(0. Md. 2001) (statute oflimitations); Waddle v. LT Lawrence & Co., No. 98C 5015,1998 WL 901687,
at *5 (N.D. III. Dec. 17, 1998) (arbitrators awarded more in damages than claimed in statement of claim);
l\Iaul v. Aznavoorian, No. C96-2965 TEH, 1997 WL 16313, at *2 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 9, 1997) (remedy may
not conform with traditional contract principles); Liberty Sec. Corp. v. Fetcho, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1323
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (lack of privity); Aragon Fin. Serv. v. Costa, No. 00-8077-CIV-FERGUSON (S.D. Fla. Mar.
29,2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (arbitrators found firm, but not agent, liable); Sunpoint
Sec. v. Porta, 192 F.R.D. 716, 720 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (contractual defenses).
168. I have included in this category cases where the court voices the suspicion of vacatur abuse or
there are other facts that call into question the bona fides of bringing the motion: the small amount of the
claim; the customer had no legal representation at the arbitration; the firm did not provide the court with
a transcript of the hearing, without which it is virtually impossible to· show "manifest disregard."
Categorization inevitably requires subjective judgments; I have tried to give brokers every benefit of the
doubt.
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using the threat of filing a vacatur motion to settle with the customer for
an amount less than the award. As an egregious example, in Freeman v.
Arahill169 one of three respondents sharing liability for a $5,000 award in
favor of the customer sought vacatur. The customer was represented,
both in the simplified arbitration and in the court proceeding, by a law
school clinic providing assistance to small investors.
This practice is more than sharp litigation tactics. Brokerage firms
and individual brokers owe their customers a duty of fair dealing,170 an
ethical standard that goes beyond legal rules.17I "Good faith" is the
governing principle 172 extending to all business-related conduct on the
part of the broker. 173 Moreover, brokers violate their duty by engaging
in conduct that undermines the NASD's regulatory functions and
discourages customers from using the arbitration system. 174 Since

See, e.g., !'I·liller v. flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998) (while motion to vacate was
pending, firm closed operations); Set subsequent case discussed supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text;
Perpetual Sec., Inc. ,'. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2002), remanded to No. 00 CIV.9389(RO), 2003
WL 1740456, at * I (S.D.N.Y. Apr. I, 2003)(S21,000 damages award; remanded for reconsideration of Rule
II sanctions; on remand, coun imposed sanctions); Cohig & Assoc. v. Stamm, 149 F.3d 1190, 1998 WL
339472, at * 1-2 (10th Cir. I998)(pro se investor awarded S20,000 in simplified arbitration proceeding); Lew
Lieberbaum & Co. ,'. Randle, 85 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (pro se customer awarded
S50,000; no transcript of arbitration); Papayiannis v. Zelin, 205 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(S4O,000 award in simplified arbitration where broker made only a cursory denial; broker's attorney allegedly
indicated broker would not pay the award voluntarily); AI-Azhari v. Merit Capital Assoc., No. 99 CIV. 9795
(LAK), 2000 WL 151914, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,2000) (firm's "manifest disregard" argument is "weak";
broker's attorney allegedly stated he was under instructions to delay recovery); Commonwealth Assoc. v.
Letsos,4O F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. I 999)(lack ofa complete record); Kruse v. Sands Bros. & Co.,
226 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (firm's "counter-petition to vacale ... dC"oid of any argument
orlegal or factual suppon"); Nohre v. W J. Gallagher & Co., No. B 151769, 2002 WL 31424914, at *4 (Cal.
App. Oct. 30, 2002) (sanctions imposed for frivolous appeal oflower coun's award confirmation).
Many o(the decisions in this category involve Stratton Oakmont, a notorious "bad firm" that
subsequently went into bankruptcy, and its principals and employees;see, e.g., Sav-A-Trip, Inc. v. Belfon, 164
F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1999); Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Shamah v. Schweiger,
21 F. Supp. 2d 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Po rush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178(E.D.N.Y. 1998); Card v. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806 (D. Minn. 1996); Greeningv. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. C-95-4288 SI,
1996 WL 61095 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1996), '!/I'd, 113 F.3d 1241, 1997 WL 222327 (9th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished opinion; coun affirmed as to individual respondent).
169. No. 111119/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author).
Fordham's securities arbitration clinic pro\;ded representation to the claimant.
170. Members "shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles
of trade" in the conduct of their business. See NASD CmmUGf 2003, supra note 27, Rule 2110, Standards
if Commercial Honor and ltincipks ifTrnde.
171. In the Matter of the Application of Timothy L. Burkes, SEC Release No. 34-32142, 1993 WL
119769, at *3 (Apr. 14, 1993), '!/I'd mnn., Burkes v. SEC, 29 F.3d 630, 1994 WL 386349 (9th Cir. 1994).
172. See Buchman v. SEC, 553 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that "breach of contract is
unethical conduct" if done "in bad faith").
173. See Henry E. Vail, 52 S.E.C. 339, 342 (1995), '!/I'd mem., Vail v. SEC, 10 I F.3d 37, 39 (5th Cir.
1996).
174. See Dept. of Enforcement v. Shvarts, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 6, at *2 (Nat'l Adjudicatory
Council, NASD Reg.June 2, 2000) (finding that the broker's failure to comply with a court order requiring
payment of attorney's fees and costs to customer was violation of Conduct Rule 2110).
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continued NASD membership is conditioned upon prompt payment of
customers' awards, m brokers are violating their obligations to their
customers and NASD by bringing vacatur motions for the purpose of
delaying payment. 176 The courts should not provide assistance for this
type of activity.

Suggested Reflnns
Whether they are acting in good faith or bad, the propensity of firms
to bring motions to vacate customer's awards and to argue for expanded
judicial review cannot be underestimated. This is a serious attack on the
finality of arbitration awards that courts should not encourage. I suggest
four reforms to deal with this problem. First, "manifest disregard"
should be eliminated as a basis for vacating arbitration awards. If there
is a consensus that arbitrators too frequently arrive at results that are
wrong on the merits, the appropriate solution is better selection and
training of the arbitrators. Second, brokers should be required to post
a bond with the appropriate SRO before flling a motion to vacate. This
should both deter frivolous motions to vacate and protect the investor
whose award remains unpaid. Third, the SROs should take disciplinary
action against firms that bring frivolous vacatur motions, as a violation
of the firm's duty to deal fairly with its customers. Finally, courts should
seriously consider award of sanctions under Rule 11 for frivolous
motions to vacate. To date, they have been reluctant to impose Rule 11
sanctions, even when they note the weakness of the broker's vacatur
motion. 177
PART FOUR

I have argued in this Article that there should be minimal judicial
involvement in the arbitration process and that some courts, in the face
of a firm's aggressive litigation, are exceeding the limits prescribed by
the FAA. One's view of the appropriate level of judicial review
necessarily depends on one's view of the fairness of the arbitration

175. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10330(h). Set also NASD Notice to r-.kmbers 00-55,
.tYASD Dispule Resolutian Will Require Firms II) Cn-tif; in I Vriting ThaJ Th£y Hm)e Complied I Vith ArbitratWn Awards
Within 30 Dlrys if Receipt (Aug. 2000), I1wilable at http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/notices (last visited July
9,2003).
176. A failure to pay an arbitration award is a violation of Conduct Rule 2110. See NASD Sanction
Guidelines (1998 ed.) at 18 (Arbitration Award-Failure to Honor or Failure to Honor in a Timely Manner).
See Shmrls, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 6, at *37 n.22, 15-17, citing relevant disciplinary decisions.
177. See discussion supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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process. There are good reasons for concern about the proliferation of
arbitration as the exclusive remedy for consumer and employment
disputes, particularly if the arbitration process is not actually, or is not
perceived as, fair. 178 In securities arbitrations the focus should be on
whether the process is fair to the investors, not brokerage firms-the
repeat players who control the contents of the customer agreement and
subsidize the arbitration forums. 179 This issue has two aspects: first, a
comparison of arbitration with litigation; and second, the fairness of the
SRO forums.
The difficulty in addressing the first issue is that, increasingly since
1987, we have litde with which to compare SRO securities arbitration.
A 2000 GAO report stated that there was no basis to make any
conclusions about the fairness ofSRO arbitration proceedings because
the caseloads were too small at an independent forum, the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), and in the courts. 180 In arbitration
investors may be disadvantaged by the availability ofless discovery, and
awards may be less than what a jury would award. 181 Investors,
however, may have an advantage in arbitration since arbitrators are not
bound stricdy to follow the law, which may impose significant obstacles
to recovery.182 Ultimately, however, this is a question on which
reasonable investors' attorneys can and do differ.
How do the SRO forums measure up as fair arbitration forums?
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that investors' attorneys
find the process at least fair enough not to seek out available alternatives. When SICA initiated a two-year pilot program offering non-SRO
alternatives, there were few takers, and the program was discontinued. 183
178. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel
arbitration of employee's sexual harassment claim because the employer set up a process "utterly lacking in
the rudiments of even-handedness"); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that employer could not require employee to pay any part of arbitrators' fees in arbitrating statutory
discrimination claims; also noting that "manifest disregard" assures adequate judicial review of statutory
claims); I\kManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 458 (2d Dist. 2003) (finding fee
allocation clause in arbitration agreement unenforceable because of risk that employee would have to pay
expenses that he would not pay in litigation).
179. The SEC and SRO reforms to make the arbitration forum more judicial have been driven by
the recognition that the consent to arbitration is largely fictitious. See Richard E. Speidel, ConJract Theory and
Securities ArbitraJion: IYhither Consent?, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1335 (1996).
180. See GAO Report, Securities ArbitraJion: Actions.Neetkd toAddress Probkm ,!!UnpaidAwards, GAO/GGD00-115, at 4 -5 (Wash. D.C.June 15,2000), m,ailahle aJ http://www.gao.gov (last visited July 9, 2003).
181. Conventional wisdom is that arbitrators are not likely to be swayed by any anti-Wall St. biases
of juries because they typically are business people with a familiarity with the securities industry and one
arbitrator on the panel is from the industry, see discussion irifTa notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
182. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 1035-1040.
183. See SICA, Final &port-Pilot Progrmnfor .,von-SRO-Sponsored Arbitration AlternaJives (undated) (on file
with author); Stephen G. Sneeringer, A SICA &periment· Et-aluating the .Non-SRO Forum Pilo~ SECURITIES
ARBITRATION COM~1ENTATOR, Nov. 2002, at I.
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In addition, an NASD-sponsored survey of participants in its arbitrations over a two-year period provides some evidence that participants
found the process fair. 184 An independent study ofinvestors ' perceptions
about the fairness of the arbitration process, however, is necessary to
provide more information on this important question. 18"
Professor Sternlight has identified the following components of
fairness in consumer arbitration: reasonable notice that the consumer
is entering into an arbitration agreement, an unbiased decision maker,
the right to representation by counsel, the right to present evidence, the
right to present one's case in a fair geographic forum, the right to
adequate discovery, the right to adequate relief, the right to know
something of the arbitrator's rationale, and the right to judicial
review. 186 In addition, arbitration should cost consumers less than the
expense of litigation, 187 particularly since the SROs have cited this as
one of the principal benefits of arbitration. 188 How does NASD
arbitration measure up under these criteria?189
As to some of the above components of fairness, .there is consensus
that the SRO process is fair.
Reasonable Notice
Of the various complaints about SRO arbitration, notice is not one
of them. NASD rules mandate the form and content of the disclosure
in the customer agreement about arbitration and its salient characteristics, and require a highlighted statement drawing attention to the

184. See Gary Tidwell etal., Party EvaluaJion qfArbitrators: An Ana[ysis qfDaJa Collectedftom.NASD Regulatibn
Arbitrations (Aug. 5, 1999), m·ailable at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/arb_evaI99.pdf(last visited July 9,
2003). Professor Tidwell was the Director of Neutral Training and Development for NASD Regulation at
the time of the study. The report analyzes survey results from parties in arbitrations that were closed by
hearing between Dec. I, 1997 and April I, 1999 (representing a response rate of 10-20% of approximately
2000 cases) and concludes that participants believe their cases were "handled fairly and without bias." Id.
at 3.
185. See Michael A. Perino, REPORTTOTHESECURITIF.'>ANDE.XCHANGECOMMISSION REGARDING
ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND NYSE SECURITIF.'> ARBITRATIONS
33-37 (No\". 4, 2002), m'ailable aJ http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf(last visited July 9,2003).
186. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality '!Ithe Supreme Court's Priferencefor Binding Arbitration:
A Fresh Assessment '!IJury Tria~ SeparatUm '!I Powers, and Due Process Concern>; 72 TUL. L. REV. I, 85-98 (1997).
187. See Public Citizen Press Release, ArbitratUm More Erpensiu 1han Court-So Cost[y 1haJ Many VICtims
'!I Consumer Fraud, Employment Discrimination Gu:e Up (May I, 2002), l1J)ailable at http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/princrelease.cfm?ID= I 098 (last visited July 9, 2003).
188. NASD Dispute Resolution: What is Dispute Resolution? Gune 10, 2002), m'ailable aJ
http://www.nasdadr.com/whatdr.asp (last visited July 9, 2003) (touting arbitration as a benefit to parties
because it provides "prompt, inexpensive alternatives ... to litigation in the courts").
189. I focus on NASD arbitration since it handles about 90% of all securities arbitration claims, but
the analysis would not be appreciably different for the NYSE.
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arbitration clause immediately above the signature line. 190 The more
troublesome issue is that customers do not have a choice about what to
do with this information because every brokerage firm requires its
customers to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of opening an
account. As a policy matter, requiring investors to sign an arbitration
agreement as a condition of opening a brokerage account may not raise
the freedom of choice issue to the same degree as when employees are
required to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment. The
Supreme Court made it clear in McMahon and Rodriguez that it is not
receptive to this unfairness argument. 191
Right to Representation by Counsel; Right to Present Evidence
NASD rules make clear that investors may be represented by
counsel, 192 and there is an active and well-qualified securities arbitration
bar. While there are legitimate concerns about the difficulties small
investors face in obtaining representation,193 this problem is not unique
to arbitration. Under NASD rules, arbitrators have full authority to
decide procedural matters, including admissibility of evidence 194 and the
number of hearing sessions. 195
Right to Present a Case in a Fair Geographic Forum
NASD conducts hearings at fifty locations throughout the United
States,196 and the hearing site is determined by the customer's residence
190. See NASD CONDUCT 2003, supra note 27, Rule 3110(1), Books and &cords. It is ironic that the
Supreme Court struck down on preemption grounds a state statute that provided comparable notice in con·
sumer agreements containing an arbitration clause, see Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 V.S. 681, 683
(1996).
191. For the Supreme Court's rejection of this argument in another consumer context, see Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 V.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding clause in passenger ticket contract requiring
litigation of all disputes in florida), otomultd 0/ 46 App. V.S.C.A. § 183c (2003) (disallowing forum-selection
clauses in passenger tickets). For a different approach, see Kloss v. Edward D.Jones & Co., 54 P.3d I (Mont.
2002) (holding that customer agreement was contract of adhesion and not within customer's reasonable
expectations; remanding for consideration of factors addressing unconscionability; also finding that broker
had fiduciary duty to explain arbitration clause).
192. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10316.
193. See SEC Press Release, SEC Announces Pilot SecuritiM ArbitratUm Clinic /0 Help STtUllllm·eslors(Nov. 12,
1997), O1Jailtzhle at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressarchive/ 1997 /97-101.txt (last visitedJuly 9, 2003) (small
investors express concerns about difficulty in obtaining counsel to represent them in arbitration).
194. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10323.
195. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10315. In contrast to NASD practice, a contractual
limitation on the length of arbitration hearings in an employee's discrimination claim was questioned, see
Brooks v. Travelers Ins. Co., 297 F.3d 167, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2002).
196. "NASD Dispute Resolution Establishes New Hearing Location in Newark, NewJersey," O1Jai/ahle
at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_043.html(last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
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at the time of the transaction. 197 Firms cannot include language in their
customer agreements that purport to dictate the hearing location. 19B
Right to Adequate Relief
NASD rules do not limit the authority of arbitrators to award
damages,199 and customer agreements cannot limit, directly or indirectly, this authority.200 News reports indicate that customers' awards
are getting larger,201 and while there continue to be skirmishes about the
availability of punitive damages202 and attorney's fees,203 increasingly
arbitrators are awarding them.
The remaining fairness components require additional discussion.
Unbiased Decision-Maker
NASD arbitration panels generally consist of two members who are
not affiliated with the securities industry and one industry-affiliated
member. 204 Major post-McMahon/Rodriguez NASD reforms have
increased the independence of the non-affiliated members and allowed
the parties greater involvement in the selection of arbitrators. 205 The
SEC and the SROs have not, however, seriously re-examined the
inclusion of an industry member on every panel, and some investors'
attorneys believe that this practice builds in a pro-industry bias. 206 Not
all investors' attorneys share this opinion, however; some believe that
industry expertise can be advantageous to a customer. 207 Before the

197. /d. at 14.
198. See NASD Notice to I\Iembers 95-16, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
199. NASD recently withdrew a proposed rule that would have capped punitive damages awards. See
Re: SR-NASD-97-47 Withdrawal (May 9, 2003) lWailabk at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/rf97_47_
wd.pdf(last visited July 9, 2003).
200. See Alastrobuono, discussed supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; NASD Rule 3110(1),
discussed supra notes 27, 188 and accompanying text; NASD Notice to Members 95-16, discussed supra notes
29, 85 and accompanying text.
201. See Ruth Simon, With Wall Street on DefensWe, Claims Against Brokrrs Surge, WALL ST.J., May 27,
2003, at AI.
202. See discussion supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
203. See discussion supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
204. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule I 0308(b)( I)(B).
205. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Notice
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 to Proposed Rule Change
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations
Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. 56670 (Sec. Release No. 24-40555) (Oct. 22, 1998).
206. See Perino, supra note 185, at 30-31.
207. David E. Robbins, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL§ 10-23 (5th ed. 200 I).
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AAA essentially ceased operating as a securities arbitration forum,208 it
also classified securities arbitrators as neutral or industry,209 so the
practice is not unique to the SRO forums. In short, arbitrator expertise
as compared to judicial impartiality is a debate for which there are
respectable arguments on both sides. 210
Right to Adequate Discovery

Post-McMahon/Rodriguez reforms have expanded the availability of
discovery to parties. Theselj efforts culminated with the Discovery
Guide, a consensus document developed by NASD and representatives
of both the industry and investors' bar that sets forth expectations of
what parties are entided to in discovery.211 Discovery in NASD
arbitration, concededly, is less than that available in litigation, most
notably with the absence of depositions except in extraordinary circumstances. Limitations on discovery are viewed as a greater disadvantage
for customers, because brokers control much of the information
necessary for customers to prove their casco The benefits of arbitration,
on the other hand, as a more efficient and less expensive alternative to
litigation, obviously diminish with increased discovery. This is another
issue where reasonable attorneys can argue about the trade-off.
Right to Know Something of the Panel's Rationale
Awards are required to be in writini l2 and must include "a summary
of the issues, ... the damages and other relief requested, the damages
and other relief awarded and a statement of any other issues
resolved.,,213 All awards are publicly available. 214 Arbitrators, however,
typically do not provide reasons in the awards. In the post-McMahon/
Rodriguez reforms, the SEC argued that arbitrators should provide some

208. ElTectiveJuly I, 1999, AAA suspended its securities arbitration rules; thereafter, any securities
disputes at AM will be arbitrated under its commercial arbitration rules. See American Arbitration Association, Supplemmtary Proctdures for SecuritUs ArbiJratWn, l1l.'ailnhle oJ http://www.adr.org/index2.1 Jsp?JSPssid=
I 6235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/focusAreal commercial! securities_rules.html (last visited July 9, 2003).
209. For a comparison of NASD and AAA rules, see Cheryl Nichols, ArbiJraJor Selection oJ the NASD:
Im'estor Perception ifa Pro-SecuriJiLs Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST.]. ON DISP. RrsoL. 63, 81-87 (1999).
210. See Perino, supra note 185, at 42-43, for a summary of the arguments.
211. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Ru!e Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Creating a Discovery Guide for Use in NASD Arbitrations,
64 Fed. Reg. 49256 (Sec. Release No. 34-41833) (Sept. 10, 1999).
212. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10330(a).
213. Id. at 10330(e).
214. /d. at 10330(1).
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explanation for their awards; SROs resisted this, asserting it would
change the fundamental nature of arbitration. 213 The debate continues,
as some commentators continue to advocate for reasoned awards. 216 In
deciding motions to vacate, courts sometimes make a point of noting the
absence of reasoning in an award, perhaps suggesting a distrust of the
process because of this. 217
As a practical matter, NASD arbitrators are unlikely to spend much
time composing awards unless they are provided compensation for
doing so. Even a brief explanation requires careful and thoughtful
drafting, for a poorly expressed or incortiplete explanation may render
the award vulnerable under the manifest disregard standard. Hardy v.
Walsh Manning Securities, Inc. 218 nicely illustrates this problem. In that
case the firm and its former CEO sought to vacate an award in the
customer's favor that found both parties ')ointly and severally liable ...
based on principles of respondeat superior." The district court confirmed the entire award even though the CEO, as an employee, could
not be found liable under respondeat superior, since it found substantial
evidence in the record that he was personally involved in the wrongdoing. The Second Circuit, however, vacated the award with respect to
the CEO and directed a remand to the arbitration panel for clarification
of the grounds for imposing liability on the individual. The majority
opinion emphasized that "substantial financial liability should not be
imposed upon an individual without a clear basis in law.,,219
Currently, NASD provides arbitrators with an honorarium based on
the time they spend in hearings and not for other tasks-however timeconsuming-that do not require a hearing session with the parties. 220
Requiring arbitrators to provide reasons for their decisions, therefore,
will increase the cost of arbitration. Is there a benefit that makes the
cost worthwhile? My own view is that reasoned awards serve a purpose
215. This debate is described in Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 996-1003.
216. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 124, at 443.
217. The most striking example of this (in an employment discrimination arbitration) isHalligan v. Piper
Jqffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating an award in favor of the firm that prCl\·ided no
explanation, in the face of what the court thought was strong evidence of age discrimination).
218. 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003).
219. /d. at 134. On remand, the arbitration panel clarified that it imposed liability on the individual
because he was a controlling person with supervisory authority and because he actively participated in the
fraud. The panel intended to impose respondeat superior liability only on the firm. Hardy v. Walsh
Manning Sec., Arbitrator's Response (Nov. 10,2003) (copy on file with author).
220. NASD arbitrators are paid a S200 honorarium for each hearing session (no more than 4 hours);
a business day typically consists of two hearing sessions, and the Chair receives an additional S75 per day.
See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Il\I-1 0 104 (Arbitrators' Honorarium) and Rule I 0332(b) (Schedule of
Fees for Customer Disputes). These rates are lower than those at other commercial arbitration forums;see
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Ser.... , 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that "fees of5500 or $600
per hour are not uncommon").
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if one wishes to create a system where they are used as precede~t221 or
where they are routinely reviewed by the courts. Since I believe both
practices antithetical to arbitration, I oppose requiring arbitrators to
state their reasoning in awards.
Others argue that there are more intangible benefits of reasoned
awards. Some assert that parties "deserve" an explanation,222 a recognition that parties may well be dissatisfied with a system that decides
major decisions in their lives without explanation. Professor Hayford
argues that the need for an explanation may be driving many vacatur
motions and that reasoned awards could reduce their number.223 Based
on my analysis of why firms bring motions to vacate,224 I am skeptical
that reasoned awards would abate the firms' challenges.
Arbitration Costs
Considerable concern has been expressed about whether arbitration
is truly a less expensive alternative to litigation for the consumer. The
D.C Circuit held, in Cole v. Burns International Securiry Senrices,225 that
employees bringing statutory discrimination claims could not be
required to pay any part of the arbitrator's fees because litigants do not
have to pay judges. Moreover, the court expressed doubt in general
about whether beneficiaries of statutory rights should ever have to pay
arbitrators' fees. 226 Subsequendy, in Green Tree Financial Corp. - Alabama
v. Randolph, 227 the Supreme Court recognized that high arbitration costs
could prevent consumers from vindicating their statutory rights, but
refused to deny enforceability bf an arbitration agreement on this
ground because the consumer did not establish those costs. 228 Mter
Green Tree the circuits have developed tests for determining excessive
arbitration costs, principally in the context of employment disputes. 229
Generally, they have rejeCted Cole's per se approach in favor of a case-

221. See EI Dorado Tech. Serv., Inc. v; Union Gen. De Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317,
321 (1st Cir. 1992); but see Wallace v. Buttar, supra note 139, that cited an arbitration award as precedent
without explanation.
222. D.<WID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL, at 13-14 (5th ed. 2001).
223. Hayford, supra note 124, at 472.
224. See discussion supra notes 146-167 and accompanying text.
225. 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997);seeaLro McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 134
Cal. Rptr. 2d 446,457-58 (2d Dis!. 2003).
226. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484. Other circuits have rejected the per se rule against fee-splitting
arrangements; for a re'lew of the law both pre- and post- Green Tree, see generally Musnick v. King Motor
Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
227. 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000), '!ff'd 244 F.3d 814{llth Cir. 2001).
228. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91.
229. See Mumick,325 F.3d at 1259.
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by-case analysis set forth in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor .$ystems, Inc. 230
This analysis focuses on "the claimant's ability to pay, ... the expected
cost differential between arbitration and litigation, ... and whether that
cost differential is so substantial" that it would deter arbitration. 231
Some district courts have enjoined arbitration of consumer disputes,
finding that consumers have met their burden under Green Tree of
establishing that prohibitive arbitration costs would deter them from
pursuing federal statutory claims. 232
Could an investor challenge SRO arbitration on grounds of excessive
costs? Federal courts have not recognized a concern for arbitration costs
outside of the area offederal statutory claims,233 thereby excluding from
consideration investors that assert only common-law claims against their
brokers. At NASD, investors are required, upon commencement of a
claim, to pay a nonrefundable filing fee that varies according to the
amount of the claim,234 as well as a hearing session deposit that also
varies with the amount of the claim. 235 Fees may be waived upon a
showing of hardship, 236 and arbitrators, at the conclusion of the hearing,
have the authority to allocate the cost of the hearing sessions among the
parties in any way they see fit. 237 The costs can be considerable. On the
other hand, claimants may benefit substantially from lower attorney
costs in arbitration, as discovery is more limited in arbitration, depositions are rarely conducted, and motion practice is less frequent. 238 An
independent comparison of the costs to investors between arbitration
and litigation is necessary before conclusions, even tentative ones, can
be made. To date at least, investors' Green Tree challenges to SRO
arbitration have not been well-received. 239

230. 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001).
231. /d. at 556.
232. See, e.g., Hurdle v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 02-2788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357, at *2123 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002) (finding that arbitration fee of S7 50 would be prohibitive, since the court had
previously found the consumer could not afford a $150 court filing fee); Arnold v. Goldstar Fin. Sys., Inc.,
No. 01 C 7694, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15564, at *34-37 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002)(findingthat a S750 filing
fee plus one-half of estimated S3600 arbitrator's fee was prohibitive, compared to S 150 court filing fee).
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821,825 (D.C. Cir. 200 I) (distinguishing Cole).
234. The minimum filing fee is S25 for a claim ofSI,OOO or less; the maximum is S600 for claims of
more than $3 million. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10332.
235. For three-member panels, the hearing session deposit ranges from S600 to S I ,200. See id.
236. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10332(a).
237. /d. at 10332(c).
238. Many investors' attorneys do not charge their clients on a hourly basis, but collect their fees on
a contingency basis, as a percentage of the recovery, so savings of attorney time may not directly affect the
cost to the investor.
239. See Ritch v. Eaton, No. CIV.A.02-7689, 2002 WL 32107628, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2002)
(finding that a $1425 filing fee, compared with a $97.50 court filing fee, was not prohibitive; customer had
substantial investment portfolio, and the comparison did not take into account other litigation costs).
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Right to Judicial Review

As discussed above,240 the FAA provides limited judicial review of
arbitration awards to assure that the process was fair. In my view,
increased judicial review is only warranted if one has reasonable
concerns about the fairness of the arbitration process. While in the four
areas just discussed, there is a need for ongoing debate about whether
the current system meets the standards offairness to which investors are
entitled, industry representatives do not have grounds to argue that they
need additional judicial protection.
CONCLUSION

What accounts for the increased judicial tendency to involve itself in
the securities arbitration process? First, it may reflect a continuing antiarbitration bias on the part of the lower courts. As discussed earlier,241
courts uniformly take an unduly narrow view of arbitrability issues that
arbitrators can decide. In addition, some courts are reluctant to allow
arbitrators to decide legal issues. 242 The development of the "manifest
disregard" standard as a ground for vacatur also suggests judicial
ambivalence toward arbitrators' having the final authority to decide the
merits of a dispute. 243 Lingering anti-arbitration bias is in sharp contrast
with the attitude of the Supreme Court, which shows no indication of
putting a halt to its pro-arbitration policy that gives broad authority to
arbitrators to decide both legal244 and factual issues. 245
Second, to the extent that courts are responding to legitimate fairness
concerns raised in the context of arbitration of employment or other
consumer disputes,246 the transfer of these concerns to arbitration of
customer-broker disputes is unwarranted. The SEC and the SROs have
worked hard to make the process fair to customers; while the task is not

240. See discussion supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
241. See discussion supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
242. See discussion supra notes 58-60,65-73 and accompanying text.
243. See discussion supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., McMalwn, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Rodriguez, supra note 3 and accompanying
text; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991 )(collecting cases). See aim Green Tree
Fin. Corp. \'. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003) (5-4) (holding that whether contracts forbid class arbitration was
a question for the arbitrator); PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. \'. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 1536 (2003) (holding
that arbitrators can interpret contractual limitation on remedies).
245. See, e.g., l\hjor League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (200 I) (holding that
arbitrator's "improvident, even silly" fact-finding is not a basis to refuse to confirm award, quoting United
Paperworks Int'l Union, AFL-CIO \'. l\'lisco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)).
246. See discussion supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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over, the brokerage industry has no grounds to assert that it is being
treated unfairly.
. Finally, courts unfortunately may be subconsciously perpetuating the
anti-investor tendencies reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court
in the 1970s and 1980s247 and in decisions of the lower federal courts
that constructed obstacles to investors' judicial remedies in the courtS. 248
As customer awards are getting larger,249 judicial discomfort with large
investors' verdicts may be reasserting itself in the arbitration forum. If
so, the lower courts insufficiently appreciate the Supreme Court's trend
of pro-arbitration, pro-investor decisions from McMahon through
Howsam.
Increased judicial involvement in the securities arbitration process
generally benefits the brokerage firms and works to the disadvantage of
investors. First, it increases the delays and the expense of the process,
costs that brokerage firms are generally better able to bear. Second,
investors are more likely to benefit from equitable, rather than legalistic,
resolution of their disputes. Arbitration is an equitable forum, and
arbitrators should be permitted to do equity, with judicial interference
kept to a minimum. If there is a consensus that arbitrators are applying
too much equity and should be applying legal standards on a more
uniform basis, then the solution is for the SROs to select and train better
arbitrators.
Finally, all participantS would benefit from continued improvements
made to the securities arbitration process through the SEC and SRO
rule-making process, which solicits input from all interested parties.
Increased judicial involvement, however, is not likely to result in the
improvement of the securities arbitration process from the standpoint of
investors. Courts should implement Howsam's vision of arbitration as a
"fair and expeditious resolution" of disputes.

247. See discussion supra note 5.
248. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 999-1005.
249. See Simon, supra note 20 I.
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